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There is no disagreement on the propositions; that development is a vital priority 
for all countries and societies; that a secure internal and external environment is needed 
for this purpose as an enabling environment, and; that where external and internal 
conflicts and potential conflicts exist, despite the alleged and controversial spin off from 
defense spending and its associated R+D, they act as a break on development and 
mitigation strategies are required. 
For Pakistan the parameters of the situation are bound by disputes with a larger 
India on one side, on the other side an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan between the Extra 
Regional Forces of the USA/ISAF/NATO and Afghan factions with its physical and 
ideological spill over accentuating internal conflicts with terrorist and extremist forces. 
All these situations and potential conflicts present mitigation challenges if we hope 
to give development the attention it deserves. 
How have we been faring, what is our scorecard, how can we do better? These are 
the fundamental questions posed by the subject of this Panel. 
On the first external front it is clear that the history of bilateral relations between 
Pakistan and India since the independence in 1947 has been beset by mistrust and 
characterised as a most difficult relationship. This has led to significant defense 
expenditure by both countries. It is clear that if relations can be improved or at least 
better managed in this age where globally confrontation is being increasingly replaced by 
cooperation, the “peace dividend” would be in the interest of both countries and improve 
the lot of their peoples a significant portion  that live in conditions of poverty or on the 
margins of poverty. In this context since the peace process begun in 2004 through the 
composite dialogue process constituted an important element for managing this 
relationship and towards efforts for its improvement.  
The eight agenda items of the Composite Dialogue are: (i) Peace and Security 
including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs); (ii) Jammu and Kashmir; (iii) Siachen; 
(iv) Sir Creek; (v) Wullar Barrage; (vi) Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking; (vii) Economic 
and Commercial Cooperation; and (viii) Promotion of Friendly Exchanges. 
While India froze the peace process after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist 
incident, it is worth assessing what was and what was not achieved to assess the utility of 
trying to restart the process in its entirety rather than through  pick and chose, presently 
the hallmark of the Indian approach.    
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Meaningful CBMs were reached in a number of key areas.  On Jammu and 
Kashmir which is a core issue for Pakistan which remains committed to a peaceful 
resolution, based on the Security Council Resolutions supporting the right of self 
determination of the Kashmiris a number of inter Kashmiri CBMs were implemented to 
bring some relief to the lives of the Kashmiri people.  The Muzaffarabad–Srinagar and 
the Rawalakot–Poonch Bus Services and an inter Kashmir trade service were initiated.  
The age-old linkage between the Kashmir people and their brethren in Pakistan was 
restored to some degree. Kashmiri liberation leaders were able to visit Pakistan. 
Nuclear and Conventional CBMs agreements were reached on Pre-Notification of 
Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles and on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to 
Nuclear Weapons. A hotline between the Foreign Secretaries was started and the hotline 
between the two Director Generals of Military Operations was upgraded.  Both countries 
recognised that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national 
security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability.  They reaffirmed their commitment 
to uphold the ceasefire along the LoC; implement the 1991 Agreement on Air Space 
Violations in letter and spirit; not to develop new posts and defence works along the LoC; 
to speedily return inadvertent Line Crosses, and; to periodically review existing CBMs. A 
hotline between the Indian Coast Guards and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency was 
initiated. 
While India has frozen the composite dialogue it is important to note that the 
above CBMs continue to be observed.  
On the economic and commercial side bilateral trade increased from US$ 181 
million to US$1956 in 2007-2008.  While trade balance was in favour of India significant 
quantities of cement were exported from Pakistan to India and the Pakistani positive 
import list expanded. The Pakistan India Joint Commission which had been dormant 
since 1989 was revived and meetings held on Agriculture; Tourism; Information 
Technology and Telecommunications; Health, Information; Environment, Science and 
Technology; and Education. Important areas where both countries face similar 
challenges. People to people contact increased. 
However overall despite some amelioration of the plight of the Kashmiri people 
there was no substantive move forward by India on the core issue of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Similarly, on Siachen and Sir Creek despite the availability of a framework for 
their resolution India kept to it’s adamantly to its negative positions. 
On the Indus Water issue, India’s tactics reflected an attitude to use its upper 
riparian position to circumvent its solemn obligations under the Indus Waters Treaty and 
to try to   build up a capability to pressure Pakistan.  
At a time when terrorism is a major threat to both countries, India has used the 
unfortunate Mumbai attack not only to freeze the peace process but also to halt the two 
mechanisms putting place for counter terrorism discussion and cooperation namely the 
meetings of the Interior Secretaries and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism. While 
Pakistan has taken all possible measures on its side in relation to the Mumbai attack, 
India is short sightedly  trying to use this incident to polemicise against Pakistan.  
In fact there is strong evidence that India is using Afghanistan territory to mount 
subversive and destabilising operations against Pakistan particularly in the border 
regions.  
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When the two Prime Ministers met in Sharm El Sheikh in July 2009 both agreed 
that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on future 
terrorist threats and that dialogue is the only way forward.  Action on terrorism was not to 
be linked to the Composite Dialogue process.  However, India went back on this 
understanding.  The recent meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries last month in New 
Delhi continued the impasse with India only interested in discussing terrorism issues. 
The Government of Pakistan has sincerely and continuously tried to restart the 
peace process in its entirety through the Composite Dialogue process.  Many Pakistanis   
disillusioned with the Indian response have called on the Government to halt such efforts.  
However, the peace process showed that while movement on vital issues was 
painfully slow, a potential window towards resolution had been opened and in some areas 
particularly in inter Kashmiri contacts and on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs which are 
important between the two nuclear neighbours some progress had been achieved to 
manage this difficult bilateral relations. 
Recent statements made by Indian military leaders of their objective to be able to 
mount aggressive actions against Pakistan under a nuclear overhang demonstrate a 
gearing differential between India’s professed peaceful intentions in regard to Pakistan at 
the political level and the reality of its strategic build up and objectives.  
Conventional and strategic instabilities are threatening to undermine strategic 
stability which has preserved the peace between the two countries since both became 
nuclear powers. 
Two developments are crucial to move from adverse relations and potential 
conflict towards resolution of disputes particularly the core issue of Kashmir and the 
Indus Waters issues and cooperation for the benefit of the two peoples. The first is for a 
fundamental realisation by India that it has more to gain through better relations with all 
its neighbours rather than through a coercive and hegemonic approach. China, for 
example has tried its best to develop good relations with all its neighbours and to solve 
territorial border issues in a generous manner. India on the other hand has extremely 
difficult relations with all its neighbours what to talk of Pakistan. 
Secondly, since peace and stability in South Asia is so important in the entire 
region and beyond, the international community has to play its part in persuading India to 
pursue a policy to meaningfully engage with Pakistan and to work for the maintenance of  
stability in South Asia which will also permit Pakistan to pursue its major global role 
against terrorism.  
On the Afghan external front here are too many powerful external actors to permit 
us to shape the environment in as  favourable a manner as we would like although we are 
doing the best we can. The occupation of Afghanistan has enhanced terrorism and 
extremism in Pakistan and if the USA can implement an exit strategy it will facilitate our 
task of overcoming out internal counter terrorism challenges. 
We should limit our  objectives in Afghanistan to having a government which does 
not allow its territory to be used against Pakistan and gives the Paktuns and other 
communities their due political ad other weight and not have any favourites. Stability on 
our western border, which we should fence, our increasing trade with Afghanistan and 
our vital access to Central Asia and also its energy supplies depends on a stable 
Afghanistan at peace within itself and with all its neighbours. 
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On the internal terrorism front, a significant challenge by itself, external 
involvement by India and events in Afghanistan have complicated our task which has 
been compounded by years of neglect and errors of omission and perhaps commission. 
While on the military front public, media and parliamentary support have provided 
the essential support needed from the Swat operation onwards, much more needs to be 
done. 
The international community has to put its money where its mouth is to fund 
infrastructural and educational programmes throughput the country and particularly in the 
most deprived areas including FATA and the other border regions. The inability to 
implement the ROZs project highlights   how much needs to be done. 
Our counter terrorism efforts are characterised by a top down approach rather than 
strengthening the basic unit Of the Thanna upwards. Explosives security remains poor. 
Intelligence coordination needs improvement. 
Our ability to mitigate external challenges and potential conflicts as well as 
internal conflicts rest on two fundamental requirements. 
First of all acting on the recognition that without provision of justice and equal 
opportunity, improving education and infrastructure we can not develop and  progress in 
any direction. 
Secondly that implementation of any mitigation strategy to meet external and 
internal challenges requires much better governance  starting with political maturity and 
planning and going down to delivery by the  bureaucratic structure which needs to be 
urgently revitalised. We have always been good at planning and formulation but weak in 
implementation. 
Knowing what needs to be done is not the problem, rather getting it done. 
